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Abstract 
Rates of permanent economic migration by women into urban India have been low and falling, in contrast 
to other parts of the world where urban capital has drawn upon young, single women as a reserve army of 
labor. In this paper I use NSS surveys from 1983 to 2008 to investigate the socio-economic correlates of 
economic, follower and marriage migration by women to urban India. The results indicate that low urban 
female economic migration rates are not a statistical aberration due to incorrectly designed survey 
methodology and that a lack of supply of “good” jobs may be reinforcing male breadwinner norms. I 
argue that both falling economic and rising marriage migration rates for urban Indian women appear to be 
a result of urban economic inequality and insecurity.  This data suggests that it is not the state-market 
tussle (that economists tend to be preoccupied with) but rather the interaction between family and market, 
and the continuing resilience of the patriarchal family in that struggle, that is the most remarkable feature 
of the Indian social and economic landscape. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper brings together two disparate strains of literature on Indian economic development. 
The first is the growing body of literature that examines the causes and consequences of strikingly low 
and stagnant female labor force participation rates in India, with the debate being over whether particular 
trajectories of economic growth in India have resulted either in women’s exclusion from, or their 
withdrawal from, the paid labor force. A second strand of literature examines stagnant rates of permanent 
economic migration within India, once again exploring the extent to which capitalist development in India 
has resulted in “exclusionary” patterns of urban growth and thus posing a similar set of questions about 
“push” versus “pull” factors in the Indian economy. This second strand of literature has, however, focused 
almost entirely on male economic internal migrants. There is very little by way of systematic exploration 
of women’s internal migration patterns in India and the ways in which the latter may be linked to changes 
in female productive and reproductive labor, male migration and the broader trajectories of Indian 
economic development. 
Historical materialist approaches to capitalist development have long recognized the crucial role 
of permanent migration (that is coercive to differing degrees) in the creation and maintenance of a labor 
force that is divorced from the means of production (Breman 1996, De Haan 1999). In areas like East 
Asia or Latin America, the migration of large numbers of young, single women from rural to urban areas 
has resulted in some attention to the ways that female migration for employment can serve as the basis for 
the development of a capitalist labor force (Sassen-Koob 1984, Standing 1999, Piper 2005). Feminist 
research has also shown how women’s unpaid work in Latin America and East Asia can sustain patterns 
of circular male migration by ensuring social reproduction in rural areas while men undertake 
economically risky urban migration (Chant 1998). This work has helped us reconceptualize migration as 
not an individual but a household or community level decision that is predicated upon gender as well as 
class inequalities. In the case of India, however, these links remain under-researched, perhaps due to the 
absence of large streams of permanent female economic migration.  
 However, if we look beyond economic migration, or migration driven by the prospect of 
employment, we find that Indian women’s overall rates of migration have risen. In particular, there have 
been sharp increases in female marriage migration into urban areas over the last few decades
1
. According 
to National Sample Survey(NSS) data, by 2007-08, women migrants comprised 71% of urban, married, 
working age women, with rural-urban migrants accounting for about 40% of this migrant population. 
Economic outcomes for these women thus have a large and significant impact on measured gender 
                                                     
1
 ‘Marriage’ migrants in India refer to women (or men) who migrate at the time of marriage in order to 
move into their spouse’s home. Patrilocality continues to be the dominant tradition in India, with the wife 
moving into the husband’s home after marriage. The husband’s home often includes the husband’s 
parents. 
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inequalities in urban India today. In particular, the labor force participation of female non-economic 
migrants has dropped by more than that of non-migrants. Learning more about the lives of these women 
could therefore help us better understand some of the factors driving the declines in urban female labor 
force participation in India.  
 This edited volume highlights the importance of seriously considering the causes and 
consequences of unpaid, reproductive labor, once defined as ‘non-economic’, and still left out of many 
non-feminist analyses of the economy. I follow this tradition of feminist political economy by examining 
forms of migration defined as ‘non-economic’ and arguing for serious consideration of the economic 
impacts of such patterns of migration (Lee 2012). Indian women migrants classify themselves 
predominantly as “follower” or “marriage” migrants, forms of migration that appear to occur within the 
family and thus outside the economy. But, as feminist economists have taught us, the family is a site of 
production and reproduction, and economic change cannot be understood without understanding how 
household production and reproduction is structured.  
 In this paper, I trace patterns of female marriage, follower, and economic migration into urban 
India from 1983 to 2008 using Indian National Sample Survey (NSS) data
2
. Specifically, I use the four 
most recent rounds of the NSS employment-unemployment survey that have asked detailed questions 
about migration
3
. These are the 38
th
 round conducted in 1983, the 43
rd
 round in 1987-88  and, skipping 
forward a decade and a half, the 55
th
 round conducted in 1999-2000 and the 64
th
 round for 2007-08
4
. 
Given that Indian economic policy shifted to emphasise privatization and market liberalization in the 
early 1990s, this data covers both pre- and post-liberalization India.  
 Since my focus in this paper is on establishing some links between male and female migration 
patterns, I restrict my sample to married, working age men and women in urban areas. The NSS surveys 
provide information on household consumption expenditure, the demographic characteristics of the 
household and occupational details of each household member. NSS data also allows us to categorize 
‘principal status’ employment (employment for 183 days or more) as self-employment, regular or salaried 
wage employment, casual or irregular wage work, or as unpaid help in a family business. Women who 
                                                     
2“Follower” migrants are defined as those who “accompany” the primary migrant or primary earner. The 
latter is assumed to have made the actual decision to migrate while the “follower” is usually treated as 
passive and without agency in the migration decision. In this paper I do not analyse educational migrants, 
who comprise less than 1% of male and female working age migrants. I also exclude international 
migrants. 
3
 The NSS employment-unemployment survey is a quinquennial, nationally representative household 
survey, but the module on migration is only intermittently included.  
4
 The three earlier surveys are ‘thick’ rounds of the quinquennial Employment Unemployment Survey 
conducted alongside the consumption expenditure surveys, and the latter 2007-08 is a separate additional 
round conducted to specifically investigate migration. However, unlike other thin rounds, the sample size 
is similar to those of the ‘thick’ rounds.  
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report purely domestic work or the free collection of goods for the household are classified as domestic 
workers (and not counted as ‘employed’). All descriptive statistics are reported using NSS population 
weights. 
 It should be noted that this data captures only ‘permanent migration”, defined in India as 
occurring when migrants stay a year or longer at the destination
5
. Field studies provide compelling 
evidence that temporary and circular migration has grown tremendously in India over the last few 
decades, and the inability of NSS surveys to capture such migration is an issue that requires urgent 
attention (Deshingkar and Akter 2009).    
CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT AND THE GENDER DIVISION OF LABOR IN URBAN INDIA  
There is widespread consensus that the Indian economy experienced a deepening of its urban bias 
after liberalization. Between 1993 and 2008, the urban economy grew from 45% to 60% of GDP based 
largely on the growth of services like information technology that employ a relatively narrow group of 
urban elites. Vakulabharanam(2010) shows that the most significant beneficiaries of post-1993 economic 
growth have been those in these high skill service occupations in urban areas, with the majority of urban 
workers actually losing ground over this period. In further evidence of this ‘urban enclave’ model of 
development, a number of studies find that inequality between rural and urban areas has risen since the 
1990s, while urban areas themselves have become more unequal (Sen and Himanshu 2004, Thorat and 
Dubey 2012, Motiram and Sarma 2013). 
While agriculture received some flows of public investment in the 1970s and 1980s, since the 
1990s rural economic growth has primarily been the result of growth in extractive sectors such as mining, 
which tend to have significant negative externalities for local economies, including the displacement and 
dispossession of large numbers of rural residents (Jackson and Rao 2012). As a result of the stagnation in 
agriculture, the income share of rural peasants and agricultural labourers has declined in relative and 
absolute terms as compared to the income share of large farmers and those who are self-employed in non-
agriculture (Vakulabharanam 2010). Relatively low- skill informal labor (such as construction work) in 
nearby towns and peri-urban areas often provide the highest wage options for rural residents. This means 
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 In each case the NSS asks if the current place of enumeration of each household member differs 
from the last ‘usual place of residence’ and then the reason for leaving the last ‘usual place of residence’. 
The answer to the first questions helps us define the category of ‘migrants’ – those who answer ‘yes’ ; 
while the second helps us classify migrants as “economic”, “marriage” etc.  Note that when women report 
being marriage migrants, they are already in their marital homes. Female marriage migration statistics 
thus represent in-migration to the marital household and region. Given that the NSS does not ask about 
the woman’s natal family, we do not have information on the exact location (at the district level) or socio-
economic details of the natal home. We are able to use information on the place of last residence to 
determine which sectoral stream (rural or urban) the migrant is part of.  
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that rural and urban livelihoods in most parts of the country are highly diversified but also highly 
precarious, depending upon the ability of household members to move in and out of a number of unstable 
and low wage economic activities during the course of a single year.   
Due to the prevalence of informalized and unstable employment, Indian employment surveys are 
notoriously unable to capture unemployment as it is defined in traditional economics. In contexts where 
the meaning of work is constantly changing, self-employment for men or intra-household, domestic work 
for women often become residual categories that absorb those who would otherwise be counted as 
unemployed. It is notable then that amongst those who are employed in urban India, self-employment is 
the only the category of employment that has expanded for urban married men. The share of working age 
married men with regular or salaried employment for a majority of the year has steadily dropped from 
45% to 39% and the share of those with casual wage work has remained relatively stable. Meanwhile, a 
large and growing share of urban married working age women report that their principal occupation is 
intra-household work.  
The shares of married men in the urban and rural labor force (versus those who may be full time 
students or otherwise not in the labor force) have both remained stable and high. In fact, labor force 
participation rates for married men (97% in 2008) are significantly higher than for single men of working 
age (89% in 2008). On the other hand, urban Indian women have significantly lower labor force 
participation rates than rural women. Furthermore, married women have about the same labor force 
participation rates as single women in rural areas, but much lower rates in urban India. 
Thus urban India is characterized by an extremely strong form of the male-breadwinner ‘classic 
patriarchy’ model in which marriage is positively and strongly associated with entry into the labor force 
for urban men, and equally strongly but negatively associated with labor force participation for women 
(Kandiyoti 1998). The decreases in urban women’s labor force participation and economic migration 
would seem to suggest that this model is being even more firmly inscribed over time. As we will see 
below, some authors interpret this as a sign of rising economic well-being that allows women to withdraw 
from the labor force. I argue instead that while there is clearly a strong normative emphasis on the ‘male 
provider’, the data on migration suggests that these norms are being reinforced by India’s urban enclave 
model of growth and are a result of economic instability and relative dispossession for a majority of urban 
households, rather than a sign of their growing prosperity.  
CHANGING PATTERNS OF INTERNAL MIGRATION IN INDIA 
 The existence of growing rural-urban inequality creates an interesting puzzle for researchers of 
economic migration in India. Despite what would seem to be almost overwhelming incentives for large 
waves of economic migration from rural to urban areas, rates of permanent economic migration into urban 
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India remain stagnant and have even declined slightly. As a share of the working age population, 
permanent economic migrants declined from 13% to 11% of the urban population.   Economic migrants 
declined from 32% to 27% of the urban, male, working age married population and from 3% to 1% of the 
urban, female, working age married population (Table 1). 
 According to this data on permanent economic migration, India has lower migration rates than 
most other Asian countries (Bell and Muhidin 2009). The literature largely explains this as the outcome of 
the Indian government’s hostility to urban in-migrants and the relative under-development of labour 
intensive formal sector occupations in Indian cities (Kundu 2009).  Such studies have found that men 
from relatively higher castes and those who with relatively more education are more likely to engage in 
internal economic migration within and to urban areas in India (Dubey et al 2006, Mitra and Murayama 
2008, Vakulabharanam and Thakuratha 2012). Kundu and Sarangi(2007) also find that these male urban 
in-migrants tend to be relatively well-off (although not the very richest) in urban areas.  These authors 
thus suggest that what we see in India is not an unwillingness to move, but an inability to do so in a 
permanent and stable way. This argument is particularly compelling given the other evidence on the 
exclusionary nature of urban Indian growth and the existence of very large and growing streams of 
circular migration (Breman 1996, Deshingkar and Akter 2009, Deshingkar and Farrington 2009). 
The studies on economic migration have, however, focussed almost entirely on male migrants who 
dominate this category of permanent ‘economic’ migrants, going from 86% to 91% of all economic 
migrants during this period. While the established story of Indian migration is currently that rates of 
permanent migration are very low, that is not what emerges when we look at female patterns of migration. 
If we look beyond just economic migration, permanent migrants as a whole have actually risen as a share 
of the Indian population –going from 23% in 1983 to 29% by 2007-08 with 87% of this increase 
accounted for by the rising share of female migrants – in particular the 90 million additional women who 
reported migrating for marriage between 1983 and 2008.  
While marriage migrants went from 40% to 52% of working age married women, the share of 
women migrating to “follow an earning member of the family” edged down from 18% to 17% while 
(Table 1). Putting these numbers together, the share of non-migrants amongst working age married urban 
women dropped down to 29% by 2007-08. Of these non-migrants, 53% were never-married and thus 
perhaps just not yet eligible for “follower” or “marriage” migrant status. Furthermore, rural-urban (rather 
than urban-urban) migrants comprised a growing share of both female economic and marriage migrants.  
The male rate of migration (of all kinds) was stagnant over the same period, falling slightly from 
18% to 15% of working age, married men, primarily due to a decline in the share of male economic 
migrants (Table 1). Male marriage migration was negligible in all rounds (under 1%) and urban follower 
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migration has been stable at 4% since 1987-88.  This means that men have become less likely to 
permanently migrate, even as women are more likely to do so. 
EXPLAINING THE LACK OF FEMALE ECONOMIC MIGRATION IN INDIA  
  Despite the need to more fully explore the multiple forms of migration that women engage in, it 
is worth pausing to note that the almost miniscule, shrinking percentage of Indian women who report 
migrating for economic reasons is unusual when compared to most other developing countries including 
China, South Korea, Thailand, Bangladesh, Mexico or even the United States and United Kingdom in the 
nineteenth centuries. Most developing countries have relied upon migrant female workers in what Elson 
and Pearson (1981) called the “nimble fingers” phenomenon.  In each case, deliberate attempts by state 
and capital to culturally legitimate the migration of young, single women from rural to urban areas have 
allowed these female migrants to serve as a docile, reliable, and low-paid reserve army (Bagchi 2011, 
Standing 1999). The absence of this phenomenon in India is therefore notable (Ghosh 2000).  
 
Disguised economic migration? 
 One possible explanation for this absence (compared to the historical experience of other 
countries) is that the much larger streams of female “marriage” and “follower” migration in India are in 
fact disguised forms of economic migration. It is certainly possible that the NSS surveys are mis-
classifying some economic migration by women as marriage migration (Krishnaraj 2005). However, as 
shown elsewhere as well (Rao and Finnoff 2015), the data do not bear out this hypothesis.  
 First, if the need for employment was indeed driving female marriage and follower migration, we 
would expect to see higher economic activity rates for female marriage and follower migrants as 
compared to non-migrants (Krishnaraj 2005). However, follower migrants have much lower shares of 
economic activity than non-migrants
6
 (Table 2). Marriage migrants do have slightly higher rates of 
economic activity than non-migrants but their employment shares are several times lower than the rates 
reported by economic migrants and have fallen considerably over time.  
  Second, if in fact marriage migration is disguised economic migration, this would mean that 
married women move with their husbands with the intent of working at the destination point, much as the 
husband does, but then report their move as a move “for marriage”.  Thus husbands must also be migrants 
and the actual journey made by the man and woman in the household must be identical – they should 
both, for example, report moving to the same destination. However, in 2007-08 only 18% of spouses of 
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 We assume here that even if the NSS is failing to capture women’s work and thus underestimating 
female economic activity rates, it is equally unable to capture the work of female migrants and non-
migrants, so that differences between these rates and changes over time are likely to be more accurate 
than the levels at any given point.  
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married female marriage migrants of working age were also migrants – as compared to 99% for follower 
migrants and 90% for economic migrants(Table 3). Furthermore, this share has dropped 10 points over 
the years. 
 Even if we assume that every one of these female marriage migrants with migrant spouses is 
indeed a disguised economic migrant, the overall share of economic migrants would only go up to about 
3% of the female, working age, married population in 2007-08, and would not change the narrative of a 
declining time trend (down from 4% in 1983). At least in this dataset, it does not seem that a substantial 
share of marriage migrants are disguised economic migrants.  
 Thus we largely analyse the NSS data as at least internally consistent and focus on using it to 
understand more about these women migrants.  In particular, we use the data to test our two competing 
hypotheses about the insignificance and further decline in female economic migration: the first that norms 
of sanskritization that have strengthened across castes and regions, resulting in a “withdrawal” effect; the 
second that ‘domestic’ work is a residual category that captures increasing female un/undermployment 
and the growing burdens of social reproduction within the urban precariat.  
 
Withdrawal versus exclusion 
 If the low level of and decline in migration for employment by women is indeed a real 
phenomenon, and linked to wider declines in female labor force participation, what explains the lack of 
interest that Indian capitalists seem to display in exploiting this very large pool of cheap labor? 
 Ghosh (2000) focuses on the low levels of female workforce participation in the export sector in 
India, a key sector for female employment and economic migration in other Asian contexts.  She argues 
that Indian manufacturing for export has remained trapped in low value-added sectors, which promotes a 
cost-cutting, rather than productivity-increasing, mentality. Indian capitalists are thus more interested in 
finding ways to sub-contract into the low-cost and low-productivity informal sector. As a result 
production for export in India tends not to rely directly upon female workers. Instead it does so indirectly, 
to the extent that female workers may be found in the informal sector.  
 Insofar as migration goes, this kind of urban development mutes the incentive as well as the 
ability to migrate permanently, by confining workers to an urban ‘precariat’ not so different from the rural 
one they are intimately familiar with. The fact that male permanent migration has also fallen is evidence 
in favor of this explanation. Meanwhile, in a context where male livelihoods are fragile, the unpaid labor 
of social reproduction that women perform is likely to involve considerable ingenuity and time without 
which the urban precariat, upon which the current model of Indian development is based, would not be 
able to secure the conditions of its existence. As we will see below, female marriage migrants are now 
both a majority of the urban female population as well as most likely to be part of this urban precariat, 
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and the fact that this is the group that has seen the largest increases in female domestic work could be 
evidence in favor of such an effect.  
 A different explanation would link low female economic migration and labor force participation 
to a “withdrawal effect” (Abraham 2012).  The greater prevalence of female seclusion amongst higher 
castes and the fact that symbols of class and caste mobility are deeply intertwined in India, mean that 
‘sanskritization’ processes result in women withdrawing from the labor force as household incomes rise 
(Srinivas 1998). Several studies suggest that as a result, female labor-force participation in India is 
distress driven and correlated with lower levels of female literacy (Eswaran et al 2011, Neff et al 2012, 
Abraham 2012), and seen, even within such households, as a failure of masculinity (Qayum and Ray 
2011). The absence of female economic migration would thus be an extension of this phenomenon. Its 
decline over time could even be seen as a sign of the increased economic status of potential ‘sending’ 
households in India.  
 In examining these two hypotheses, the main differences lie in the theorized impact of class (in 
the Weberian sense of a combination of education and income) upon female economic migration. If 
changes in female migration patterns are being driven by exclusionary urban growth or decreased demand 
for female workers, we would expect to see higher class status (education, household per capita 
consumption and spousal employment) become stronger predictors of female economic migration as 
permanent migrations streams become restricted to ever more narrow groups of the privileged. On the 
other hand, if female economic migration is being driven by a withdrawal effect, then it is likely to be 
more educated and better off women who drop out first to signal their higher status. Understanding that 
marriage and follower migration may also be shaped by these broad economic forces, I examine the 
changing class correlates of those forms of migration as well. 
 
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN MIGRANTS 
 As prior research has shown, male economic migrants in urban India appear to belong to higher 
class groups. Almost 32% belonged to the top income quintile as compared to 17% of non-migrants 
(Table 4)  and 70% had some post-primary education as compared to 67% of non-migrants, although 
these gaps have narrowed over time (Table 6). Interestingly, while economic migrants were more likely to 
have regular or salaried wage employment than non-migrants, there has been a relatively sharp fall in the 
share of male migrants with such employment (Table 7) and a corresponding increase in the share of 
migrant men who are self-employed. Casual wage worker shares have remained low and stable for male 
economic migrants.   
Since 1987-88, there has been an increase in the share of male economic migrants whose spouses 
report being migrants (Table 3). In particular, a rising share of spouses report being follower migrants. 
10 
 
Thus married male economic migrants are more likely to report making the journey with their spouses, 
who in turn are less likely to report being economic migrants themselves.  
In the case of female migrants, we have three categories of migration to track. Almost 99% female 
follower migrants reported that their spouses were economic migrants, and largely shared their husbands’ 
relatively privileged socio-economic characteristics, while 82% of marriage migrants reported that their 
husband was a non-migrant in 2007-08, a percentage that grew from 72% in 1983(Table 3). To the extent 
that urban male non-migrants appear to be worse off on average than male migrants to urban areas, 
female marriage migrants are the most likely to be part of the urban precariat. This hypothesis is borne 
out by a preliminary analysis of the socio-economic characteristics of these women.    
 As we can see in Table 6, urban female economic migrants, as well as, over time, non-migrants, 
had higher shares of post-primary education than marriage migrants. Female economic migrants also had 
significantly higher shares of households in the top quintile (Table 4). Follower migrants resembled 
economic migrants in this, while marriage migrants have the lowest shares of top quintile households.  
A look at the employment profiles of these women and their spouses helps us understand why. Not 
surprisingly, female economic migrants are overwhelmingly more likely to be employed with the share of 
employed female economic migrants going from 62% in 1983 to 81% in 2007-08 (Table 6). However, 
they also had high and growing shares of salaried employment, which come with benefits and are usually 
relatively stable (Table 7). Follower migrants had the lowest shares of employment, but it was marriage 
migrants who saw the largest declines in employment over this period. Interestingly, economic migrants 
and marriage migrants were both comprised of growing shares of rural-urban migrants while follower 
migrants were increasingly likely to be moving between urban areas.  
 Female economic migrants were, however, slightly more likely to belong to the lower caste Dalit 
and Adivasi groups (Table 5). This may reflect the relative absence of a tradition of female seclusion 
amongst these groups, even though other studies suggest these norms are converging across castes 
(Deshpande 2012). It is also possible that what we are seeing here (given the very small absolute number 
of economic migrants) is the effect of state affirmative action policies in employment that might increase 
the likelihood of Dalit and Adivasi women  holding jobs in education or other forms of government 
service.   
With respect to spousal employment, the first thing to note is that the share of female economic 
migrants who are currently married is lower than the average for all urban women. Amongst single 
economic migrants, a greater share (20%) were divorced or separated than never married (16%). Overall, 
about 43% of female economic migrants had no spouses, and a further 15% had spouses who were not 
currently employed. Thus half of female economic migrants were, to use Raka Ray’s terminology, 
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‘women without men’, either literally or figuratively7. Meanwhile those with spouses, as we saw earlier, 
were a relatively privileged sub-group in every way except their caste status. 
Follower migrants were not only the most likely to have employed husbands, but also the most 
likely to have employed husbands with salaried jobs, a tendency that has strengthened over successive 
NSS rounds (Table 8 and 9). Follower migrants thus emerged as the most likely to fit the narrative of a 
genuine “withdrawal effect” –relatively well-off and with spouses in salaried employment.  
Female marriage migrants, the only group that actually grew over this period, were the least 
privileged across these different metrics. Urban-urban marriage migrants were, however, better off than 
rural-urban marriage migrants with 24% reporting being in the top quintile and 29% reporting husbands 
with salaried employment, both higher than rural-urban marriage migrants.  Rural-urban marriage 
migrants were in a much more vulnerable situation economically. Only 11% reported being in the top 
income quintile and only 41% reported having any post-primary education at all. And yet, only 20% 
reported being employed in 2008.  
On almost all metrics non-migrants were close to, but slightly better off than marriage migrants. 
They were certainly better educated, had slightly higher shares of top quintile households and higher 
shares of spouses with salaried employment but in the latter two cases they were worse off than follower 
and economic migrants. They also had lower shares of employed husbands and migrant husbands. Based 
on our indicators of household standard of living, they appear relatively economically vulnerable, 
although perhaps not as much as marriage migrants.  
 Non-migrants were also the only other group that saw a decline in the share of women with 
employment, although the decline was smaller than in the case of marriage migrants. While follower 
migrants continued to have the lowest female labor force participation rates during this time period, our 
preliminary analysis thus suggests that is amongst the two most economically vulnerable groups that we 
see the greatest declines in female labor force participation. 
Looking at categories of female migration separately suggests that while a ‘withdrawal’ story may 
fit the situation of follower migrants into urban areas, it is less likely to hold up for marriage migrants. 
Furthermore, given the shrinking socio-economic privilege of male economic migrants, it is quite possible 
that any socio-economic basis for a withdrawal effect amongst follower migrants is weakening. 
Meanwhile, female economic migration has become more concentrated amongst the highest class groups 
of those women who are have a spouse. 
There is undoubtedly a very strong ‘male provider’ norm that governs the gender division of labor 
in urban India. However, this preliminary examination suggests that a lack of supply of good jobs in the 
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 The Precarious Middle Class: Gender and Migration in India’s New Economy. Lecture by Raka Ray at 
Boston University, Feb 28, 2014. 
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urban economy for both women and men, in conjunction with increases in the burden of reproductive 
labor, may better explain the changing migratory patterns we observe than a withdrawal effect that is 
driven by rising class status. It would seem useful then to turn to regression analysis to test if these socio-
economic correlations hold up to the introduction of controls. 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Where I report regression results, due to considerable endogeneity between the various 
independent variables used, I interpret the results as partial correlation coefficients rather than as evidence 
of causal mechanisms. In the case of the regressions, I do not use weights both because I am combining 
data across different rounds as well as to avoid problems of inflated standard errors and thus levels of 
significance. I control for heteroscedasticity by clustering standard errors upon the primary sampling unit, 
the village. 
Table 10 presents odds ratios for a logistic regression with the dependent variables being the 
probability of being an economic, follower, or marriage migrant respectively, within the sample of all 
urban, working age, married women. Odds ratios greater than 1 indicate that a unit change in the 
independent variable increases the likelihood of the dependent variable taking the value 1. The size of the 
odds ratio(above the value of 1) indicates the size of the increase. Thus an odds ratio of 1.2 indicates that 
a unit change in the independent variable causes the dependent variable to become 20% more likely, 
while an odds ratio of 0.8 suggests a 20% decrease in the likelihood of its occurrence. 
 Amongst the independent variables are age in years and a dummy variable that takes the value 1 
if the woman has received any post-primary education. I include real monthly per capita household 
consumption (in 2011-12 Rupees) as well as the square of the real monthly real household per capita 
consumption to account for any U-shaped effects. I am also interested in the differing impact of caste 
status upon women’s participation in these different migratory streams. I use dummy variables to signify 
membership in the most historically disadvantaged caste groups, Adivasis and Dalits.  
The principal occupation at the household level is the occupational category, either self-
employment or wage work, that accounts for the largest share of household income. This is likely to 
coincide with the primary earner’s occupation (usually the husband). As we have seen above, economic 
and follower migrants are more likely to have spouses who are engaged in regular or casual wage work, 
while marriage migrant, who tend to marry non-migrants, are more likely to have spouses who are part of 
the urban self-employed. Time dummies for each of the first three NSS rounds are included to capture 
changes over time (relative to 2008) that persist after controlling for these variables. 
I use the NSS household consumption data to calculate the average urban state-level household 
per capita consumption. This helps control for the fact that better off states may attract larger streams of 
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male and female economic migrants. I also include the urban Gini coefficient at the state level. Greater 
urban inequality, as discussed earlier, may reduce the ability and desire to engage in permanent economic 
migration. In previous co-authored work, I also found that urban inequality sharply increases marriage 
migration, a finding that is replicated here as well (Rao and Finnoff 2015). 
In Table 11, I add two key characteristics of the spouse: a dummy variable that takes the value 1 
if the spouse is currently employed, and a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the spouse is a 
migrant. Based on the preliminary analysis above, married economic migrants are much more likely to 
report that their spouses are unemployed and thus that they are ‘pushed’ into the labor force due to the 
absence of a male provider. Also, follower and economic migrants are likely to migrate with spouses, 
while marriage migrants’ spouses are more likely to be non-migrants. Introducing these variables helps 
control for the fact that household income in particular may be a function of the man’s characteristics as 
much as the woman’s. It thus helps to isolate any correlations with income that are specific to the woman 
herself.  
The results largely confirm the preliminary analysis above. Economic and follower migrants are 
more likely to be older than other women while marriage migrants are younger. Post-primary education 
increased economic and marriage migration but decreased follower migration. Economic and follower 
migrant households were more likely to earn a majority of their income from forms of wage work, rather 
than self-employment. 
Household per capita consumption exponentially increased the likelihood of economic migration 
for women, providing more weight to the exclusion hypothesis. However, being Dalit or Adivasi also 
increased female economic migration, which suggests that caste based norms about women’s mobility 
have not entirely converged yet. As expected based on the exclusion hypothesis, urban inequality lowered 
the likelihood of economic migration for women, but this was not statistically significant. 
Follower migrants were, as expected, from upper castes with wage work as the primary source of 
household income. The inverted U-shaped result for household consumption suggests such migrants’ 
household are more likely to inhabit the middle of the urban consumption distribution.  These are all 
results that align with what we know about male urban economic migrants, whom these women report 
following. Controlling for the spouse being employed or a migrant did not change any of these results. 
As we had seen earlier, male migrants were slightly more likely over time to report that their 
spouses were also migrants (rather than perhaps remaining in the village or being urban non-migrants). 
Once we controlled for spousal characteristics, the results on the time dummies confirm that the 
likelihood of follower migration has actually increased over the rounds. Thus there is an “unexplained” 
time trend here that may, as suggested earlier, match the “withdrawal” hypothesis of strengthening norms 
against women’s workforce participation for this relatively upper caste and class group. On the other 
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hand, this could also be a result of increasing reproductive work burdens that both require men to bring 
their spouses with them, and then keep women out of the paid labor force. 
The results for marriage migrants echo our prior analysis in almost every respect. They are 
younger and live in poorer households (the relationship is exponential) whose income comes primarily 
from self-employment. As with economic migrants, Dalits are also more likely to be marriage migrants. 
Reminding ourselves that these are also the two primary streams of migration though which rural women 
move to the city, the broader conclusion may be that it is Dalit women who are increasingly likely to 
migrate to from village to city. These women are thus very much part of the urban precariat, and 
controlling for the spouse’s employment and migration status does not change any of these results.   
We also find that there has been an increase in the likelihood of such marriage migration and, 
very interestingly, that the likelihood of marriage migration increases in poorer states and is strongly and 
positively correlated with greater levels of urban inequality. These are results discussed further in other 
work (Rao and Finnoff 2015).  There we argue that for the families of relatively well-educated rural 
brides, marrying their daughters and sisters to men who live in urban areas provides a very valuable 
foothold into the urban economy that the highly skewed labor market is unable to afford them. Whether 
these women’s lives are improved by becoming part of the urban precariat is an open question, but for the 
poorer urban families who receive them, this is not only a much needed and otherwise lacking validation 
of status in the most unequal urban areas, but also comes with material benefits given the rising levels of 
dowry that accompany such marriages. 
 
DISCUSSION OF THE REGRESSION RESULTS 
Patterns of migration suggest some evidence for a “withdrawal effect” amongst relatively well-off 
follower migrants, but not for economic migrants or marriage migrants. In particular, the regression 
results above clearly indicate that marriage migrants are part of the worst off in urban areas. This makes it 
extremely unlikely that their swelling numbers should signal a “shining India” where increasing economic 
well-being has made it possible for women to stay home. Instead these migration patterns taken as a 
whole tell a story of a population responding in complex ways to an exclusionary urban economy where 
labor market opportunities for men and women are highly restricted. The willingness to look beyond 
narrow notions of the ‘economic’ reveals that these responses occur through both market as well as 
family. In the context of migration, through changes in women’s marriage and follower as well as 
economic migration.   
It seems likely that many of these women are being shut out of the labor force by a lack of decent 
work that can accommodate their reproductive work burdens.  However, knowing that so many marriage 
migrants are relatively well-educated, rural-urban marriage migrants also suggests that some normative 
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status effects may be at work. Field studies show that in rural areas, brides who have a good education 
and are able to bring large dowries with them are unwilling to perform ‘hard labor’. They see their 
dowries as guaranteeing that they will not have to perform arduous work ‘outside’ (Ramamurthy 2011). 
The urban precariat in India has little access to work that is not arduous and thus, as suggested by 
Deshpande (2012) and Jackson and Rao (2009), the absence of ‘good’ jobs may reinforce norms of 
female seclusion, making women’s labor force participation even less likely. Indeed one could even argue 
that women, or rather the family structures that surround them, draw upon these norms to actively resist 
becoming cheaper, super-exploited replacements for men and machines. 
  Srinivas’ original formulation of sanskritization described not an unchanging tradition making its 
presence felt but rather a morphing of tradition to accommodate status signalling in a new context of 
inequality and social churn (Srinivas 1998). Evidence on dramatic changes in gender norms in recent 
years have been provided by a variety of studies showing that norms amongst the lower castes and in the 
relatively more gender-progressive southern regions of India have changed to resemble those of the upper 
castes in northern India, in a patriarchal “race to the bottom” of sorts (Deshpande 2002 and 2012, Kapadia 
1995, Basu 1999, Rahman and Rao 2004). Gender norms in India are thus not immutable (Uberoi 2012). 
This body of work suggests that rather than changing to accommodate greater paid female labor force 
participation, they have changed to suppress it. I argue here that these changes are a response to 
heightened inequality and economic instability. Our “missing” female economic migrants in India may 
thus be as much an outcome of the particular model of capitalist development in India as the rising share 
of the urban economy in GDP. 
In the long term, what we may also have here is a vicious cycle where the failure to create the 
kinds of decent work that families in India would be willing to allow their women to perform also 
adversely affects decisions to invest in female education. While Indian parents are more likely to send 
their daughters to elementary and middle school than before, there has been much less change in rates of 
higher education amongst Indian girls. In the NSS data, only 24% of rural 18-year old girls were in 
school in 2008, an increase from 1983 but in rural areas, not dramatically so. As Kingdon and Unni(2001) 
have shown, in India returns to education increase with higher levels of education so that schooling below 
the middle school level has almost no labor market benefits.  These are the young girls who would have 
been drafted by urban capital in the alternate universe of India-as-China. In India, however, in the absence 
of employment that can justify permanent economic migration into and across urban areas, they are ever 
more dependent on marriage as the source of their livelihood.  
CONCLUSION 
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 Overall it does appear that the NSS data across these four rounds is fairly internally consistent.  
That is, we don’t see any sharp overlaps or inconsistencies in the data that might suggest that disguised 
economic migration is high in India, at least when it comes to permanent migration. Instead, economic 
migration appears restricted to relatively a small and shrinking group of either well-educated and well-off 
women within Dalit and Adivasi groups, or to women without a male provider. While follower migrants 
do exhibit some signs of a ‘withdrawal effect’, marriage migrants appear to occupy such precarious 
spaces in the urban economy that any such ‘withdrawal’ is unlikely to be a sign of increased prosperity. 
Furthermore, the fact that a majority of their husbands are not economic migrants themselves suggests 
that it is marriage, rather than employment, that is the direct draw to the city for these women. We are left 
with the sense that there is no significant stream of permanent female employment migration in India, 
disguised or otherwise.  
  The absence of a large, labor intensive manufacturing sector in urban India is certainly part of the 
reason, but so is the complex interplay between ‘classic patriarchy’ norms about male breadwinners 
(which promise women economic security through marriage) and a climate of clear and present economic 
insecurity. Economists tend to be preoccupied with the ways in which market and state reshape each 
other. But examining patterns of female economic as well as non-economic migration in India remind us 
yet again that economic change plays out equally dramatically in the interaction between the family and 
market. Indeed it may be that struggle, and the continuing resilience of patriarchal norms in that struggle, 
that is one of the most remarkable features of the Indian economic landscape today. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Share of migrants in the urban, working-age(15-64), married population 
  Women Men 
  All migrants Economic Follower Marriage 
All  
migrants Economic 
1983 61 3 18 40 37 32 
1988 64 2 17 45 36 31 
1999 67 2 16 49 33 28 
2008 71 1 17 52 31 27 
 
 
Table 2: Share of those employed(principal and subsidiary status) 
     Women Men 
  Non-migrant Economic Follower Marriage Total Non-migrant Economic Total 
1983 23 62 15 24 23 96 97 96 
1988 24 66 16 22 23 96 97 96 
1999 22 63 18 19 21 95 96 95 
2008 21 81 15 17 19 95 96 95 
 
 
 
Table 3: Share with a spouse who is a migrant 
  Women Men 
  Non-migrant Economic Follower Marriage Non-migrant Economic 
1983 12 94 98 28 47 92 
1988 12 94 98 27 53 92 
1999 11 88 98 23 57 93 
2008 10 90 99 18 63 94 
 
 
 
Table 4: Share in the top consumption quintile 
     Women Men 
  Non-migrant Economic Follower Marriage Non-migrant Economic 
1983 18 34 31 19 17 38 
1988 21 35 31 17 17 36 
1999 25 38 31 17 19 34 
2008 24 39 30 17 17 32 
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Table 5: Share who belong to Dalit and Adivasi caste groups 
  Women Men 
  Non-migrant Economic Follower Marriage Non-migrant Economic 
1983 15 18 15 17 17 16 
1988 15 18 14 16 17 15 
1999 17 23 16 18 19 16 
2008 17 19 17 17 18 17 
 
Table 6: Share with any post-primary education 
     Women Men 
  Non-migrant Economic Follower Marriage Non-migrant Economic 
1983 27 31 32 26 44 53 
1988 32 41 34 29 47 54 
1999 50 54 48 53 60 66 
2008 58 59 52 53 67 70 
 
Table 7: Share of those with regular/salaried wage work 
    Women Men 
  Non-migrant Economic Follower Marriage Non-migrant Economic 
1983 5 33 3 4 36 65 
1988 7 31 3 3 36 62 
1999 8 38 6 4 34 58 
2008 7 53 5 4 33 56 
 
Table 8: Share with a spouse who is employed 
     Women Men 
  Non-migrant Economic Follower Marriage Non-migrant Economic 
1983 89 84 91 91 19 12 
1988 89 82 93 91 18 13 
1999 88 83 92 91 17 14 
2008 88 75 92 90 17 13 
 
Table 9: Share of women whose spouse has a salaried job 
  Non-migrant Economic Follower Marriage 
1983 38 50 62 40 
1988 41 49 58 38 
1999 40 50 55 34 
2008 36 43 51 33 
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Table 10: Logistic Regression Analysis: Likelihood of Economic, Follower and Marriage migration for 
urban, working age, married women (state dummies included but not reported, available upon request) 
  Economic migrant Follower migrant 
Marriage migrant 
  
N= 173967 N= 173967 N= 173967 
  Odds ratio Std error Odds ratio Std error Odds ratio Std error 
Age 
1.015*** 0.002 1.012*** 0.001 0.988*** 0.001 
Post-primary education 
1.226*** 0.052 0.782*** 0.015 1.051*** 0.016 
Adivasi 
2.271*** 0.202 0.954 0.048 0.699*** 0.035 
Dalit 
1.435*** 0.092 0.931* 0.027 1.081*** 0.026 
Household:Self employed  
0.476*** 0.022 0.531*** 0.010 1.423*** 0.019 
(log)mpce(2011-12 rs) 
0.912 0.263 40.709*** 13.430 1.053 0.116 
(log) mpce squared 
1.038* 0.018 0.818*** 0.017 0.976* 0.007 
State average per capita 
consumption 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.999*** 0.000 
State gini(rural) 
0.493 0.470 1.664 0.806 134.111*** 64.808 
Year_1983 
1.826*** 0.243 1.046 0.066 0.274*** 0.018 
Year_1988 
1.559*** 0.218 0.998 0.065 0.332*** 0.023 
Year_1999 
1.235* 0.130 0.895* 0.042 0.588*** 0.029 
 
*p<0.05, ** p<0.0, ***p<0.001 
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Table 11: Logistic Regression Analysis: Likelihood of Economic, Follower and Marriage migration for 
urban, working age, married women with spousal characteristics included (state dummies included but 
not reported, available upon request) 
  Economic migrant Follower migrant 
 
Marriage migrant 
  
N= 131110 N= 131110 N=128916 
  Odds ratio Std error Odds ratio Std error Odds ratio Std error 
Age 
1.009*** 0.002 1.013*** 0.001 0.990*** 0.001 
Post-primary education 
1.288*** 0.061 0.873*** 0.019 0.991 0.015 
Adivasi 
2.269*** 0.191 0.916 0.047 0.799*** 0.027 
Dalit 
1.569*** 0.096 0.902*** 0.028 1.091*** 0.021 
Household:Self employed  
0.717***1 0.035 0.768*** 0.016 1.281*** 0.017 
(log)mpce(2011-12 rs) 
0.447*** 0.067 2.446*** 0.567 1.064 0.111 
(log) mpce squared 
1.059*** 0.010 0.947*** 0.014 0.984* 0.007 
State average per capita 
consumption 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.999*** 0.000 
State gini(rural) 
0.569 0.467 2.077 0.873 55.463*** 14.723 
Spouse_employed 
0.766*** 0.053 1.437*** 0.053 1.117*** 0.025 
Spouse_migrant 
18.174*** 1.216 252.162*** 13.614 0.357*** 0.005 
Year_1983 
1.821*** 0.199 0.712*** 0.039 0.342*** 0.012 
Year_1988 
1.448*** 0.168 0.658*** 0.038 0.423*** 0.015 
Year_1999 
1.293*** 0.106 0.739*** 0.030 0.669 0.016 
*p<0.05, ** p<0.0, ***p<0.001 
 
